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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

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7 OCT 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

7 October 1970
(VOL. XXI, No. 40)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 28 SEPTEMBER - 4 OCTOBER 1970

Moscow (4237 items)

Middle East	(14%)	23%
[Nasir's Death	(--)	19%]
Azerbaijan 50th	(--)	13%
Anniversary		
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	8%]
China	(3%)	8%
[National Day	(--)	6%]
Luna 16	(23%)	7%
Indochina	(5%)	3%
Soviet-Romanian	(--)	2%
Treaty Rati-		
fied		
Indian President	(5%)	2%
Giri in USSR		
Nixon Tour	(1%)	2%

Peking (2837 items)

PRC National Day	(0.3%)	49%
[Foreign Greetings	(--)	22%]
and Observances		
[Joint Editorial	(--)	5%]
[Chou En-lai	(--)	4%]
Reception, Speech		
[Lin Piao Speech	(--)	4%]
Middle East	(40%)	16%
[Nasir's Death	(--)	5%]
Other Domestic	(29%)	15%
Issues		
U.S. Provocations"	(0.5%)	5%
in South Korea		
Guinea National Day	(--)	3%
Indochina	(11%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

The PRG proposals introduced at the Paris talks on 17 September were given high-level Soviet endorsement when General Secretary Brezhnev in his 2 October Baku speech said that the "new step of the Vietnamese patriots has met with full approval and understanding in the USSR." Soviet reports of President Nixon's meeting with Ambassador Bruce in Ireland on the 4th claimed that the PRG proposals had made such an impact on world public opinion that it was necessary for the President to discuss them with his Paris delegates.

Vietnamese communist media at this writing have not reported the President's consultations with Ambassador Bruce, although a Hanoi domestic broadcast on the 3d made a passing reference to the planned meeting in the course of reporting hostile demonstrations during the President's European trip. A 7 October article in the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, entitled "Nixon's Shameful Tour," is typically abusive in casting doubt on the President's expressed desire for peace in the world: "Nixon himself is the top criminal who has prolonged the war and extended it throughout Indochina."

Peking has used the occasion of the PRC's National Day on 1 October to reaffirm its commitment to support the three Indochinese peoples "in their war against U.S. aggression." And on the 6th NCNA announced the signing that day of the annual agreement with the DRV on "economic and technical aid" and a "protocol on military aid." Peking's studied avoidance of the Paris talks is pointed up in a 4 October NCNA report of a PRC National Day reception in Paris: Listed among those present are PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh and Xuan Thuy, "government minister of the DRV now in France."

Communist media have not been heard to acknowledge Phnom Penh's announcement of the National Assembly decision to proclaim the Khmer republic on 9 October. But Peking's NCNA on the 5th publicized the second Sihanouk statement within a week containing a condemnation of the notion of the Lon Nol regime imposing a republic on the nation. Sihanouk's message to Chou En-lai on PRC National Day implicitly criticizes the USSR when it says that "some big powers" do not follow the PRC's lead in giving aid to the Cambodian and other oppressed peoples.

DRV GIVES LITTLE ATTENTION TO PARIS TALKS, SCORES PRESIDENT

Vietnamese communist media revert to the cursory treatment of the Paris talks that was standard prior to the 17 September PRG eight-

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point "elaboration" of the 10-point position: attention is confined to the brief VNA and LPA accounts of the 86th session on 1 October. There is no new comment on the PRG initiative from either Hanoi or the Front, but there is continued publicity for favorable foreign reaction, including Brezhnev's remarks in his 2 October Baku speech.

Vietnamese communist propaganda has not acknowledged press speculation about a new U.S. initiative, and the President's 4 October meeting with Ambassador Bruce in Ireland had been virtually ignored. The only known mention came in a 3 October Hanoi domestic service broadcast which, in the course of reporting demonstrations during the President's European trip, said that a number of organizations in Ireland had condemned their government "for allowing" the meeting with Bruce.

The only substantial Hanoi comment on the President's European trip comes in the 7 October QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article which pictures it as an attempt to win support for U.S. policy, said to be in an "isolated position." The paper is typically abusive in branding the President the "top criminal"; it says the West Europeans called him a "murderer, a fascist, or a fugitive war criminal" and demanded an immediate withdrawal from South Vietnam. The article makes no reference to the Paris negotiations, but it claims that in Yugoslavia the President "brazenly stated that 'there is no hope for a negotiated end to the Vietnam war.'"

PARIS The VNA account of the 1 October session of the
SESSION Paris talks duly notes that both Mme. Binh and Xuan
 Thuy again criticized the "negative" U.S. attitude
toward the PRG's eight-point "elaboration" of the 10 points.*
After having ignored the substance of the PRG proposal in his
formal statements at the last two sessions, Xuan Thuy joined
Mme. Binh in reviewing its basic points. However, the VNA
account reports only his reference to U.S. "refusal" to agree
to withdrawal of all troops by 30 June 1971.

Both communist delegates claimed that the PRG initiative has been welcomed in the United States, with Xuan Thuy asserting

* VNA inexplicably reverses the order of the speakers and incorrectly reports Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh and Xuan Thuy as speaking before the allied delegates.

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that "many people" in the United States think it affords an opportunity that the Nixon Administration should not miss. The VNA and LPA accounts, however, fail to report these remarks. (Also omitted from the accounts are Mme. Binh's criticism of the continued U.S. call for mutual withdrawal and the U.S. position that the PRG's "legitimate" demands are in fact "pre-conditions," as well as her and Xuan Thuy's remarks questioning the sincerity of U.S. expressions of concern regarding prisoners.)

The accounts note Mme. Binh's comment that if the United States really desires peace and respects the people's right to self-determination, it has "no reason whatever" to oppose the formation of a peaceful Saigon administration without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem and the formation of a provisional coalition government in South Vietnam. VNA also reports her assertion that even U.S. public opinion urges that the Thieu-Ky-Khien clique be abandoned.

The VNA account typically dismisses GVN delegate Lam's statement by saying simply that he used "sophistical arguments to counter the new peace initiative" of the PRG. Similarly, VNA distorts the nature of Bruce's remarks in saying curtly that he recalled the "extremely preposterous and insolent allegations" of the United States in opposing the two key demands of a total troop withdrawal and the renunciation of the GVN. VNA adds that Bruce "also raised the so-called question of 'prisoners of war.'"

BREZHNEV SUPPORTS PRG EIGHT-POINT PROPOSAL

High-level Soviet support for the PRG eight-point initiative was registered by Brezhnev in his 2 October speech in Baku when he said that the proposal has met with "full approval and understanding in the Soviet Union." Brezhnev thus went beyond Podgornyy, who in a 23 September speech had praised the "new and constructive proposals." Brezhnev prefaced his endorsement by saying that the proposals contain a "good and fair basis" for stopping the war and for "establishing a coalition government."* But he did not

* Soviet leaders, unlike routine Moscow propaganda, are not known to have mentioned a coalition government. However, the 4 December 1969 Warsaw Pact statement criticized the U.S. representatives at the Paris talks for refusing to discuss "the question of a provisional coalition government in South Vietnam, although no progress toward a settlement in Vietnam is possible without the solution of this question."

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go on to acknowledge any of the substance of the PRG initiative. Where Podgorny last month called upon the United States to make "reciprocal steps," Brezhnev said that if the United States "duly appraises" the PRG step, "soberly assesses the situation, and displays reason," a political settlement "may make headway."

A 6 October IZVESTIYA editorial repeats Brezhnev's language in expressing "full understanding and approval" of the PRG initiative and calling upon the United States to "soberly analyze" the situation and "display reason." But it does not explicitly mention a coalition government when it says the proposals contain "reasonable conditions for the liquidation of the conflict in Vietnam, for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, and for the formation of a government which would reflect the will of the people and all South Vietnamese democratic and progressive forces."

In a speech at the 6 October dinner for visiting French President Pompidou, Podgorny apparently made no specific remarks about a Vietnamese settlement. Judging from TASS summaries, he merely expressed Soviet readiness to develop "bilateral political consultations" in cooperation with France to help restore peace in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.*

NIXON-BRUCE
CONSULTATIONS

A Moscow domestic service broadcast on 4 October said President Nixon's meeting in Ireland that day with the leaders of the U.S. Paris delegation was evidence that the PRG proposal had "made such an impact on the world that it became inevitable that the head of the White House must study them." A foreign-language newscast on the same day, pegged to the meeting, stated that Ambassador Bruce's initial reaction to the initiative was "negative," but that the proposal had gained such support in the world that the United States "must find a better reply." The report cited "observers" as speculating that before the November elections President Nixon will declare "a new insignificant reduction of U.S. forces in Vietnam as a counter-proposal."

* Last April TASS had promptly reported the French Cabinet statement expressing concern about spread of the Vietnam war to Cambodia and Laos and proposing general negotiations, but Moscow did not report on the notion directly, just as it never acknowledged Soviet UN delegate Malik's 16 April remarks endorsing the concept of a new Geneva conference. See the TRENDS of 22 April 1970, page 3, 6 May, pages 10-11, and 13 May, page 8.

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A 6 October commentary broadcast in English to North America, criticizing the U.S. failure to make an "official reply" to the PRG initiative, notes in passing that the President's consultations with the Paris delegation in Ireland produced "no change" in policy. It quotes a White House spokesman as saying after the conference that the Paris talks are "deadlocked."

NEW "MASSACRE" IN SOUTH VIETNAM DENOUNCED

A "second Son My massacre" is claimed by the Vietnamese communists in reports and commentaries on an incident involving South Korean forces on 16 September. During an operation in Binh Duong village, Thang Binh district, Quang Tin (communist Quang Nam) Province, 100 civilians, mostly women and children, are alleged to have been killed. VNA first reported the incident on 30 September--the day it was acknowledged at a news conference by GVN Military Region 1 commander General Lam, who said that 22 civilians, including 8 children, were killed. VNA cited as its source an article that appeared in the 23 September edition of the Saigon daily TIN SANG, which in turn had reported that a GVN Lower House deputy had revealed details of the incident on the 21st in Danang.

A spate of denunciations* has followed the initial VNA report, with Hanoi radio on 2 October carrying articles from NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. LPA on the 3d carried an undated statement issued by the "South Vietnam Committee to Denounce U.S.-Puppet Crimes."

CAMBODIAN "PATRIOTS'" ATTACKS ON COMMUNICATION LINES PRAISED

Recent communist attacks on four main highways (Routes 1, 4, 5, and 6) in the Cambodian interior near Phnom Penh are praised in a 4 October Liberation Radio commentary. Predicting continued operations of this type, the article recounts recent attacks against each of the roads, for the most part citing Western press dispatches to portray their gravity. The broadcast notes that one of the reported attacks involved disruption of the current

* PRG press spokesman Duong Dinh Thao also discussed the incident in his news conference after the 1 October session of the Paris talks. Consistent with general practice, Vietnamese communist media did not report the news conference.

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Cambodian Government operations along Route 6 in the direction of Kompong Thom city: It says the 10,000-man government force was "surrounded" and "seriously distressed and confused" when several bridges were destroyed by the "patriotic forces." Faced with a situation where the road was cut at both ends, it continues, the government forces could neither advance nor retreat and the drive to Kompong Thom city was postponed. "Also noteworthy," the commentary says, is the "increasingly isolated" position of Phnom Penh from the countryside as a result of the attacks on the lines of communication.

PRC NATIONAL DAY: PEKING SUPPORT, VIETNAMESE GRATITUDE

Hanoi marks the 21st anniversary of the founding of the PRC in standard fashion with a message of greetings to Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai and with speeches at a "grand meeting" and a Chinese embassy reception, as well as lower-level events. The NFLSV/PRG sent a similar message.

This year the North Vietnamese were represented in Peking by Vice Premier Nguyen Con--in China to negotiate the annual aid agreement--and DRV Minister of Agriculture Nguyen Van Loc. PRG Ambassador Nguyen Van Quang is the only South Vietnamese listed as attending the main activities in Peking, but a South Vietnamese journalist delegation also arrived in the capital for the celebration, according to an NCNA report on the 29th. (The 20th PRC National Day last year drew high-level delegations from North and South Vietnam, headed by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong and NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, but in 1968 Hanoi was represented by its ambassador and two vice ministers and the Front by a Central Committee member and a "combat hero.")

China's commitment to support the three Indochinese peoples were reaffirmed by Chou En-lai in his annual reception speech and by Lin Piao in his speech at the rally.

DRV The "grand meeting" to mark PRC National Day was held in Hanoi on 29 September and reported by VNA the next day. The meeting did not draw the top-level party leaders who attended the 20th anniversary meeting last year; but it was attended, as in 1968, by Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi. An opening speech was delivered by Hoang Quoc Viet--reported by NCNA but not VNA--and the main addresses were delivered by Dang Thai Mai, vice president of the Vietnam-China Friendship Association, and PRC Ambassador Wang Yu-ping.

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The Vietnamese speakers predictably voiced appreciation for Chinese support and assistance, and the PRC envoy promised that the Chinese people would "do their best to support" the Vietnamese and Indochinese struggles. The longer NCNA account of the meeting does not include a passage in Dang Thai Mai's speech, reported by VNA, that condemns the United States for "obstinately seeking to oppose the PRC, continuing to occupy Taiwan, plotting to create two Chinas, and stubbornly opposing the recognition of the legal seat of the PRC at the United Nations."

Truong Chinh attended this year's PRC embassy reception, along with fellow Politburo members Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi, and Hoang Van Hoan and Secretariat members Le Van Luong and Nguyen Van Tran. (In 1969 all the top-level leaders in Hanoi attended the reception, but in 1968 Pham Van Dong was the highest-level Vietnamese present.) Dong spoke at the reception this year as in 1968, expressing gratitude for China's "heartfelt support and great and valuable assistance."

The DRV message of greetings expresses similar gratitude and asserts that the Chinese have always given Vietnam "sincere and powerful support and enormous and effective assistance." The message closely resembles the one sent in 1969, but it omits the previous perfunctory reference to the PRC cultural revolution.

NFLSV/PRG The South Vietnamese message this year, as last year, was signed by Nguyen Huu Tho, NFLSV chairman and head of the PRG Advisory Council, and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat. It declares routinely that the South Vietnamese "have consistently received powerful support and sympathy, and sincere, enormous, timely, and effective assistance" from China. Like the DRV message, it does not mention the cultural revolution.

SIHANOUK A message from Sihanouk to Chou En-lai on PRC
MESSAGE National Day, carried by NCNA on 1 October,
 effusively thanks the PRC for its "complete and
extremely powerful support and multifarious, gratuitous, and
decisive assistance," without which the Cambodian people's
struggle would have been "hopeless." Sihanouk seems to be
implicitly criticizing the USSR when he says that the Cambodian
people and all oppressed peoples are encouraged because China,
unlike "some big powers," places its power and wealth at the
service of struggling peoples.

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VNA and the FUNK radio have not carried this message, just as they apparently ignored an earlier FUNK/RGNU statement on PRC National Day which, as carried by NCNA on 30 September, thanked China for its aid and support and called the teachings of Mao and Lin Piao on people's war "a contribution of great importance" to the Cambodian struggle.

ANNUAL PRC-DRV AID AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN PEKING

On 6 October NCNA and VNA reported the signing of the annual PRC-DRV aid agreements, with VNA calling them agreements on China's "nonrefundable economic and military aid to Vietnam for 1971" and NCNA describing them as an agreement on Chinese "economic and technical aid" and a "protocol on military aid" to Vietnam. The NCNA report adds that the aid is "aimed at completely defeating the U.S. aggressors and their running dogs," strengthening the economic and defense power of the Vietnamese, and further enhancing the "militant friendship and unity between the people of China and Vietnam."

The accords were signed by Nguyen Con, leader of the DRV Government economic delegation which arrived in Peking on 12 September on the first leg of the annual tour of a DRV delegation to conclude aid agreements with the communist states.* The Chinese signator was, as usual, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien; Chou En-lai attended the signing ceremony, as is customary. According to VNA, Nguyen Con and Chou both spoke, Nguyen Con thanking the Chinese for their aid and Chou stressing that the Chinese are determined to support the Vietnamese until "final victory."

On 7 October NCNA reported that the delegation left Peking that day, without mentioning its destination. The group's arrival in Moscow was briefly reported by TASS on the same day.

HANOI REPORTS SIHANOUK STATEMENTS SELECTIVELY

VIETNAMESE Hanoi media continue to be inconsistent in
PRESENCE reporting Sihanouk statements, including those
on the issue of the Vietnamese communist presence
in Cambodia. The 3 October VNA summary of Sihanouk's "eighth
message to the Khmer nation"--carried by NCNA on 25 September

* The arrival of the delegation and background are discussed in the 16 September TRENDS, pages 9-10.

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and by the FUNK radio on the 27th--includes a perfunctory acknowledgment that Sihanouk condemned the Phnom Penh regime for referring to the Khmer "patriots" as "Viet Cong" and "North Vietnamese." But Hanoi still has not reported the statement by Sihanouk's private secretariat--carried by NCNA on 24 September--which scored Phnom Penh for its "lies" about support from the seven million Khmer and about the presence of "Viet Cong" and "North Vietnamese invaders."

Hanoi media's belated 1 October reports of Sihanouk's message to the Khmer Buddhist monks--carried by NCNA on 20 September and by the FUNK radio from the 20th to the 22d--omit the references to the Vietnamese communist presence in Cambodia. In the message Sihanouk had denounced charges of "imaginary" Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia but at the same time cited Western press references to the Viet Cong presence.*

ISSUE OF RECOGNITION The Hanoi domestic service version of Sihanouk's message to the Khmer Buddhist monks, but not the shorter VNA summary, briefly mentions his comments on the recognition issue. The domestic service summary says that the Lon Nol "clique" is "recognized only by the United States and a small number of countries in the American camp, whereas the RGNU has been recognized de jure by 24 countries and national liberation movements in the world." The summary does not report Sihanouk's discussion of the European communist countries' failure to recognize the RGNU.

VNA had also apparently ignored a 13 July RGNU foreign ministry statement rebutting a "distorted report" by a Canadian correspondent which cited Sihanouk as saying that he was "disappointed" at the USSR's refusal to recognize his government. The RGNU said that Soviet behavior could be attributed merely to differing "interests" of the USSR and the RGNU.

UN ROLE A DRV Foreign Ministry statement carried by Hanoi on 1 October supports the RGNU statement on the 25th UNGA session, first carried by NCNA on 24 September. The DRV statement reasserts that the RGNU is the "only legal and genuine government of the seven million Khmer people" and condemns

* VNA had previously publicized Sihanouk comments on the Vietnamese presence and even quoted him as denouncing, in his 20-21 March statement, the Vietnamese infiltration of Cambodia.

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alleged U.S. plots to use the United Nations and "other international bodies" to "legalize and maintain the illegal Lon Nol/Sirik Matak administration."

Unlike the RGNU statement, the DRV's does not go on to argue that the Phnom Penh regime has "no right" to occupy the Cambodian seat at the UN. Neither does it echo the RGNU's criticisms of the United Nations for failing to react to the "massacres" in Cambodia and of the Secretary General for deciding, without consulting member governments, to recognize the Lon Nol regime as the government of Cambodia. These omissions may be a reflection of Hanoi's consistent stand toward the United Nations--that it has no right to interfere in the Vietnam question.

DISPUTE OVER LAOTIAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES CONTINUES

Complaints that Souvanna Phouma has never replied to Souphanouvong's messages of 30 August and 20 September were repeated at a 29 September press conference held in a "liberated area of Sam Neua Province" by Tiao Souk Vongsak, Souphanouvong's special envoy to Souvanna Phouma for preparations for a meeting between plenipotentiaries of the two princes.

Souk had returned to Sam Neua on the 28th, after having been in Vientiane since 31 July. According to Pathet Lao media, in his press conference statement Souk reviewed complaints that Souvanna Phouma has gone back on his 25 June proposal that plenipotentiaries meet at Khang Khay, suggesting changes of the site of talks to Vientiane, Paris, and "other cities", and appointing an illegal "government delegation" instead of a plenipotentiary. Answering newsmen's questions, Souk said he is still authorized to carry out his duties as special envoy and is "prepared to continue the discussions" with Souvanna Phouma if the latter wishes.

Souk also complained at the press conference that "the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen" had launched air and ground attacks against "liberated areas" in Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, and Attapeu provinces as part of their effort to "crush" the meeting between the two princes' plenipotentiaries and avoid a peaceful settlement of the Laotian question.

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On 3 October the Pathet Lao news agency carried an NLHS Central Committee statement, dated 29 September, similarly complaining that by launching new military operations the United States and its "henchmen" were trying to elude a peaceful settlement. A similar statement on 17 September had also charged the United States and its "lackeys" with trying to obstruct meetings of the plenipotentiaries by launching intensified military campaigns.

SOUVANNA Pathet Lao media have not thus far acknowledged a
MESSAGE 27 September message from Souvanna Phouma to
 Souphanouvong--sent on 1 October via Soth Pethrasy,
the NLHS permanent representative in Vientiane--announcing that
he has designated Pheng Phongsavan as his plenipotentiary to hold
talks with Souphanouvong's representative, Phoune Sipraseuth,
"on problems concerning future meetings between negotiating
delegations of the government and the NLHS.* On 29 August
Souvanna had sent a message to Tiao Souk Vongsak appointing
Pheng as his plenipotentiary for talks with Souk in Vientiane,
but he did not mention Khang Khay and did not send the message
to Souphanouvong.

HISTORY OF LAO "GENUINE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY" REVIEWED

The history of the struggles of a "genuine revolutionary party" in Laos is reviewed in an unusual article by Kaysone Phomvihane, vice chairman of the NLHS Central Committee, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the proclamation of Laos' independence on 12 October. As carried by the Pathet Lao news agency in English on 5 October, the article nowhere mentions the party's formal name--"Lao People's Party." There is no known reference to the party in past propaganda on this anniversary.

It is unclear why the Pathet Lao has chosen to publicize the party at this time, but the motive may be to strengthen its position in view of the continuing contacts between the two Laotian Princes on the issue of a Laotian settlement and the possibility of negotiations on the establishment of a new coalition government.

* On 5 October VNA reported that Phoune Sipraseuth arrived in Hanoi that day as head of a delegation for a "friendship visit" and to attend celebrations of the 25th anniversary of the proclamation of Laos' independence on 12 October.

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The article reviews the party's allegedly leading role in the Laotian people's "struggle against imperialism." It traces the roots of the party back to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) and acknowledges its ties with the parties of the other Indochinese countries today. Asserting that the Laotian people fight in cooperation with the fraternal Vietnamese and Cambodian peoples, it declares that the victories of the Indochinese peoples over the past 25 years "cannot be separated from the introduction of Marxism-Leninism into Indochina and the founding of the ICP in 1930 by the late President Ho Chi Minh, as well as from the correct line and clearheaded leadership of the genuine revolutionary parties of the working class in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos." Later, the article says that "since the ICP was founded, the Lao revolution has gotten a correct orientation" and the "genuine revolutionary party has gotten a correct revolutionary line and method."

The article says that the Vietnamese struggle has a "direct bearing" on the Laotian revolution and that the Laotian revolution enjoys "huge support and assistance" from the socialist countries. While these things are important, it adds, nevertheless the fundamental and determining factor in the triumph of the Laotian revolution remains "the correct leadership of the genuine party."

The party has the dual task of carrying out the "national" revolution to liberate the people from imperialist domination and the "democratic" revolution to liberate them from bourgeois and feudal forces at home. But the party has "laid stress" on the former, says the article, in order to concentrate on the fight against imperialism and its lackeys. Reviewing the party's revolutionary line and flexible tactics, the article says it has "combined armed struggle with political struggle," using various forms of struggle, including "legal, diplomatic, parliamentary, several negotiations, and two national coalition governments." However, it says, the party always regards "armed and political struggle as the two fundamental ones, the former being the most important form to win victory."

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MIDDLE EAST

Soviet propaganda in the aftermath of Nasir's death continues to emphasize the themes set forth in the Soviet leaders' condolence message, with the communique on Kosygin's talks in Cairo placing stress on assurances of continuing Soviet support for the Arabs and the importance of Arab unity. Comment repeatedly points to the Egyptians' intention to follow Nasir's course in domestic, Arab, and foreign policy, particularly in strengthening UAR-Soviet friendship. A new element appears in the propaganda on the 6th with Moscow beginning to draw attention to anticipated efforts by "foreign and local reaction" to thwart the course of the UAR revolution.

Moscow continues to stress the need for a political settlement of the Middle East crisis. It promptly notes the UAR's agreement, as stated by its foreign minister on the 6th, to extend the cease-fire agreement for another three months. At the same time, Moscow says "certain American circles" consider the Jarring mission "wrecked" and believe the search for a peaceful settlement should be postponed indefinitely. Brezhnev in his 2 October Baku speech repeats the complaint, prominent in other propaganda, that the U.S. Government continues to support Israel in its efforts to frustrate the Jarring mission, and encourages it with new "offensive arms," talking about peace but "sowing seeds of discord and hostility."

Brezhnev also stresses the inadmissibility of any foreign interference in Jordan's affairs, a line reiterated in the propaganda, which continues the even-handed reportage on the Jordanian situation. Commentators praise the efforts of the Arab leaders, particularly those of Nasir, in easing the crisis; at the same time, Moscow takes considerable credit for the effects of Soviet "initiatives" in preventing the crisis from further exacerbating the Middle East situation.

MOSCOW SEES CONTINUITY OF GOOD RELATIONS AFTER NASIR'S DEATH

KOSYGIN STATEMENT Moscow gives wide publicity to Kosygin's 1 October tribute to Nasir over Cairo radio and television in which he praised Nasir's efforts to give his people national dignity and honor, his struggle against "imperialism and Israeli aggression," and his endeavors to strengthen Arab unity. Quoting Nasir on Soviet-UAR friendship, Kosygin said his "outstanding personal contribution to establishing and strengthening" this friendship is highly appreciated in the Soviet Union. He added

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that the Soviet delegation is authorized to assure the Egyptian leaders and people that the Soviet course toward development of all-round relations with the UAR, defense of the interests of the Arab peoples, and strengthening their independence and economic and defense potential remains unchanged. Kosygin also repeated the standard line that the Soviet Union supports a stable peace in the Middle East and "the inalienable right of all the peoples to independent existence" in conditions of peace and security. He seemed to advise the Egyptians to insure a smooth changeover of power, expressing confidence that the loss of Nasir "will not weaken your ranks, will not create any 'vacuum' your enemies hope for," but will increase the unity of the Egyptian people and the other Arab peoples.

BREZHNEV ON NASIR In his remarks on the Middle East in his 2 October Baku speech, Brezhnev noted the "untimely loss of the hero of the liberation struggle of the Arabs." Calling Nasir's death a "heavy loss" for the Arab people, he paid tribute to him as a great patriot, ardent fighter against oppression and aggression and for freedom, independence, and social progress, and a wise statesman, "one of the leaders" of the Arab world "with the greatest prestige." He also said that Nasir was "one of the people" who laid the firm foundations of the "great friendship" between the peoples of the USSR and the UAR and other Arab countries.

Brezhnev went on to convey "warm, comradely greetings" to "our good friends--the leaders of the UAR, comrades in arms of Jamal Abd an-Nasir--who--we are convinced of this--will honorably continue the work of the late president." He pledged to "our Arab friends" that the CPSU and Soviet Government and the Soviet people "will continue to unwaveringly follow the course of sincere friendship and fraternal cooperation" with the UAR and to give "all possible support" to the Arabs' just struggle for the liberation of their lands and the establishment of a durable peace in the Middle East.

SOVIET-UAR COMMUNIQUE The joint communique on the talks held by Kosygin and his delegation during their 29 September-3 October stay in Cairo for Nasir's funeral sets the tone for propaganda envisaging continuity of close UAR-Soviet friendship and cooperation. Noting that the Soviet-Egyptian talks were held in a "friendly and cordial atmosphere," the communique says the two sides have always regarded their countries' friendly relations as a "permanent factor unaffected by changes in international situations"--a line stressed in

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subsequent Moscow comment. The document notes that a "mutual resolve" to continue strengthening the "close bonds" of friendship and cooperation was "unanimously expressed" during the talks, and the sides also expressed "unanimous resolve" to continue the all-round development of Soviet-Egyptian relations "continually advocated" by Nasir.

The communique does not spell out the need for a political settlement of the Middle East conflict, although this is reiterated in concurrent elite and routine propaganda, and appeared in the communique on Nasir's last visit to the Soviet Union in July. The present document says the sides intend to "continue pooling and coordinating their efforts" aimed at a settlement of the Middle East conflict and other major international problems. (The July communique had said that the sides discussed further steps to achieve a political settlement and declared for "further coordination of their efforts" in this direction.) It adds that the sides reaffirmed the need for the earliest elimination of the Israeli aggression and "establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East for all peoples" of the area.

In effect giving the impression of a smooth working relationship established in the recent talks with the Egyptian leaders, the Moscow version of the communique goes on to say that to achieve these aims, the two parties "will adhere to a line jointly worked out by both sides." But Cairo media insert a phrase underlining continuity of relations rather than suggesting the establishment of new ones, rendering the passage "they will adhere to a line jointly worked out with the UAR leaders under the late President Nasir."

Again stressing the "particular importance" of Arab "anti-imperialist unity," as did the July communique, the current document points to the need for Arab "solidarity and cohesion" in view of "incessant imperialist intrigues," and expresses the sides' confidence that Arab unity of action "on an anti-imperialist basis" will help the Arabs achieve success in their struggle for national independence, progress, and the earliest settlement of the Middle East conflict.

CAIRO In listing the Soviet side to the talks, the communique
TALKS mentions only those already named by TASS as members of Kosygin's delegation, but Cairo reports on an "expanded" meeting of the delegations on the evening of the 2d, with a second round the following morning, indicated the presence of other Soviet officials. A 2 October MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA)

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report on the evening meeting listed, in addition to the delegation members, the head and assistant head of the Middle East section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, as well as the head of the "Soviet experts" in the UAR and his deputy. The UAR side, as reported by MENA, was the same as that listed in the communique.

Both Cairo and Moscow media reported other meetings between members of the two sides, and there are reports from Arab and Soviet sources of Kosygin's meetings with other Arab leaders, including Algeria's Boumedienne, Sudan's an-Numayri, Syria's al-Atasi, and the Tunisian foreign and justice ministers. In reporting that the Soviet delegation called at al-Qubba Palace on the 2d to meet with as-Sadat and other Egyptian leaders, TASS did not mention--but MENA did--that the Soviets and Egyptians were later joined at this morning meeting by an-Numayri, Libya's al-Qadhafi, and Fatah leader Yasir Arafat.

U.S. DELEGATION In what is apparently Moscow's only reference to the U.S. delegation to the funeral headed by HEW Secretary Richardson, TASS correspondent Freeman, reporting from New York on the 2d, attributed to the Chicago DAILY NEWS correspondent in Paris a report that President Nixon's choice of "little-known" Elliot Richardson to represent the United States "is regarded apprehensively" by Western Midcast experts. Richardson, the TASS item said, is the "lowest-ranking head of a major delegation" at the funeral. The "experts" were said to have warned that sending the HEW Secretary "is likely to be taken as a calculated slap" at Arab emotions and grief. While the President cited the lack of diplomatic relations with Cairo as a reason for not attending the funeral, the item went on, "unhappy Egyptians" recalled that when Eisenhower died, although there were no official relations, Nasir sent his close foreign policy adviser Mahmud Fawzi to the funeral.

TASS failed to mention any of the meetings of U.S. delegation members with Egyptian officials in Cairo. MENA is the only source for a brief report on the 3d that Kosygin "met informally for a short time" with Secretary Richardson on the 2d.

BROADCASTS IN ARABIC Moscow's Arabic-language broadcasts on 29 and 30 September and 1 October were devoted almost exclusively to Nasir's death and subsequent developments. "Special bulletins" on the 29th and 30th included reports on Soviet condolence messages, reaction to the death in Moscow, Cairo, and other Arab capitals, a statement by the UAR ambassador in Moscow, and various tributes and talks by Soviet

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personalities. On 1 October the Arabic service reported the funeral, and carried recollections of Nasir by Soviet orientalists, summaries of Kosygin's Cairo radio and television tribute, and tributes by other Soviet personalities as well as by famed Egyptian singer Umm Kalthum, and condolences and tributes from East European capitals.

On the 4th Moscow carried in Arabic a commentary by TASS correspondent Trushin from Cairo, which was also excerpted in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA. Trushin again emphasized the Arabs' resolve to follow Nasir's behests. Asserting that "imperialist and Zionist forces" were trying to exploit Nasir's death to "provoke a split, uncertainty, and confusion" among the Arab peoples, he said that "American propaganda" was "increasingly suggesting" to the Arabs that it was useless to resist the forces of "imperialism and Zionism" and futile to struggle for compliance with Resolution 242. He accused Western news agencies of trying to present the situation in the UAR as "'tense' and 'full of uncertainty,'" adding that the facts showed something else; he pointed to the UAR army's readiness along the Suez Canal to reply to any Tel Aviv "provocations" aimed at "frustrating the cease-fire agreement," and to the full support of the Egyptian masses for the UAR leadership.

COURSE OF SUCCESSORS Moscow's reportage and comment on events in Cairo following the funeral strongly emphasize the Egyptians' determination to adhere to Nasir's course of action in Soviet-UAR relations and in domestic, Arab, and international policies. Moscow reported meetings of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) Supreme Executive Committee and the first cabinet meeting since Nasir's death, citing the Cairo press as observing that the meetings confirmed that the UAR's political and state institutions "are functioning normally." The Egyptian papers are reported as headlining the need to continue Nasir's course and to strengthen Soviet-Egyptian cooperation in the development of their relations and coordination in efforts to settle the Middle East conflict.

TASS on the 6th reported that the ASU on the 5th had unanimously approved as-Sadat's candidacy for president. The dispatch pointed out the next steps in the constitutional procedure to elect a new president, with an emergency session of the UAR National Assembly meeting on the 7th, and a nationwide referendum on the 15th.

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**"REACTIONARY
ELEMENTS"**

Cautionary remarks about foreign and domestic "reactionary elements" first appear in Moscow propaganda on the 6th, along with observations on the recognition in Cairo of the need to "mobilize the masses" in the struggle for the realization of Nasir's principles. PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov, in a dispatch reported by TASS and Moscow in Arabic, said it would be a mistake to expect that "external and internal reaction will not have another showdown with the progressive forces" following Nasir's death. "Certain people in the West," the correspondent added, dream of "reactivating" in the UAR "those who are long since dead as far as politics are concerned" and of reversing the UAR development, using all forms of "imperialist pressure." He claimed that the "imperialists" would like to disrupt unity in the UAR, to "deprive it of effective leadership, to isolate it from its friends and to create a political crisis" within the country.

Also on the 6th, TASS and Moscow's Arabic service, reporting UAR National Assembly President Shuqayr's address to an ASU central committee meeting, cited him as warning the Egyptian people against the threats of local and foreign reaction. According to the Arabic-language broadcast, Shuqayr said that the Egyptian revolution has clashed in the past 18 years with "the opposition composed of a bunch of reactionaries," and there "is no doubt that this small bunch of exploiters is trying to deal a new blow to the progressive regime at a critical moment."

ISRAEL, U.S. ACCUSED OF FRUSTRATING JARRING MISSION**BREZHNEV
SPEECH**

Moscow continues to profess concern at the stalemated Jarring talks, accusing the United States of backing Israel in sabotaging the mission. Opening his remarks on the Middle East in his 2 October speech in Baku, Brezhnev charged Israel, "supported by the U.S. Government," of doing everything to frustrate the Jarring mission. Behind the smokescreen of "invented accusations" against the UAR, he said, Israel's military command is trying to strengthen its positions in the occupied Arab territories, especially on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, and increasing its forces for new "piratical strikes" against the Arab countries. Picking up another common propaganda theme, Brezhnev declared that the "Israeli rulers, with characteristic insolence," are telling the world that they are not thinking of returning to the 1967 boundaries.

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Turning from Tel Aviv to Washington, Brezhnev declared that the "U.S. Government continues to abet the Israeli aggressors," encouraging their sabotaging of the talks and sending Israel "continuous new consignments of offensive arms" for a new attack on its neighbors. It is evident that in Washington they talk about peace but in fact "diligently sow the seeds of discord and hostility," he said.

RESUMPTION OF JARRING TALKS Reporting President Nixon's remarks to newsmen in Ireland on 4 October, TASS the next day said he "actually went on record" against an immediate resumption of the peace talks under Jarring's auspices, stressing that in his opinion "the conditions for them were 'not ripe.'" A Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on the 6th, citing the President's reported statement, observed that "that attitude looks very much like Israel's attitude of obstructing the talks." And PRAVDA correspondents Kolesnichenko and Nekrasov, in a dispatch from New York reported by TASS on the 7th, mentioned that "certain American circles" are harping on the opinion that Jarring's mission "was wrecked and that a search for a peaceful settlement, linked with the mission, should be postponed for an indefinite time." This opinion, they added, "is insistently preached exactly by those who are crying about the need of strengthening American military might in the Mediterranean."

TASS on 2 October reported that Jarring would leave shortly for Moscow to resume his ambassadorial duties, citing U Thant's spokesman as saying that Jarring would return to New York in mid-October and that if needed he would return to the United Nations without delay. The Tsoppi commentary on the 6th said that Jarring left New York "without at all expecting" that Israel would decide to make fruitful contacts with the Arab countries in New York in the near future. In fact, Tsoppi said, it is very difficult to hope for this, with the Tel Aviv leaders making "more and more impertinent statements daily" to the effect that Israel will not agree to the talks and will not withdraw from the occupied territories.

CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS Moscow continues to dismiss charges of UAR violations of the cease-fire standstill as fabrication.
Reporting UAR Foreign Minister Riyad's 6 October Cairo television interview, TASS noted that he rejected as unfounded the Israeli and U.S. assertions that the UAR has violated the cease-fire agreement. The brief report did not include Riyad's statement that the UAR will not withdraw a single missile and will not even accept discussion on the subject, and his statement that all missiles

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were introduced into the region before the date set for the cease-fire. TASS did include Riyadh's charge that the United States violated the agreement by adopting a decision to provide Israel with new armaments and the Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on the 6th claimed that Israeli Defense Minister Dayan, in "brazenly" pointing out that the Israeli army is using the cease-fire to improve its position, admits that Israel is violating the agreement "which the Arabs observe."

in one of the propaganda's rather infrequent explicit acknowledgments of Israel's rationale in not proceeding with the Jarring talks, a Fedorov article in NEW TIMES No. 39 (Russian edition 25 September) said Israel wants the United States to support its decision to boycott the Jarring talks "until the UAR agrees to dismantle the missiles which were supposedly 'illegally' installed" in the Suez Canal zone right after the beginning of the cease-fire.

EXTENSION OF CEASE-FIRE Moscow has reported expressions of interest in an extension of the cease-fire period by the United States, Britain, and the UAR, but apparently has not acknowledged Israeli statements of readiness to continue to observe the armistice beyond the cease-fire deadline. A domestic service broadcast on 4 October noted without comment that following President Nixon's talks in London, U.S. and British officials agreed on the desirability of extending the agreement for a further 90 days. And the TASS report of UAR Foreign Minister Riyadh's Cairo television interview on the 6th cited him as saying that the UAR is ready to extend the agreement for another three months "provided effective measures" be taken "at the time" to implement Resolution 242.

MENA, providing highlights of the interview, cited Riyadh as saying the UAR is prepared to extend the cease-fire for another three months; but in MENA's text of the interview, Riyadh said at one point that under no circumstances would the UAR agree to change the temporary cease-fire into a permanent one; later, asked about an extension, he said only that "if it appears to us that serious efforts are being made toward a peaceful solution and that Jarring is able to carry out his mission to implement the resolution, we will undoubtedly give Jarring and the United Nations the opportunity and the time necessary to implement it." MENA on the 6th also reported that according to AL-AHRAM's 7 October issue, Provisional President as-Sadat explained to Secretary Richardson that the UAR "cannot agree to extend the cease-fire except for a limited period; naturally, if we see that Jarring has returned to resume his mission and has made some progress in realizing hope for implementation" of

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the resolution, "then we will be prepared to discuss extension of the cease-fire period."

Moscow's views on the extension of the cease-fire period have not been made explicit in the propaganda. A PRAVDA article by Kolesnichenko and Nekrasov, reported by TASS on the 7th, did suggest an interest in an extension when it said that the "only reasonable possibility" of settling the Middle East problem in the interests of all sides lies in implementation of Security Council decisions on the Middle East "by the means outlined by a cease-fire agreement between the sides" and contacts with Jarring. The Radio Peace and Progress broadcast on the 5th, which claimed that the 90-day cease-fire was adopted as a result of "coordinated, joint effort" by Soviet and Egyptian officials, noted "talk in the West" about extending the cease-fire period and added cryptically that "no one will deny that the time factor in the circumstances is most significant."

BIG FOUR TASS on the 7th reported State Department spokesman
TALKS King's announcement at a press conference on the 6th that the United States wishes to suspend the Middle East talks among the deputy delegates of the Big Four at the United Nations "until it will be possible for them to resume." The report did not mention that the announcement said the United States wished to suspend the deputies' talks pending "rectification" of reported standstill violations. In a Washington-dated dispatch, TASS noted that although the spokesman said the United States will take part in the conferences of the Big Four UN ambassadors, specifically the 12 October meeting, "newspapers say" that Washington's "negative step" cannot but complicate implementation of Resolution 242. The State Department spokesman explained the decision, TASS added, by "alleged violations of the standstill agreement" in the Suez Canal zone by the UAR, and a "similar excuse" was used by the Israeli Government to prevent the beginning of the Jarring contacts. TASS concluded that Tel Aviv's "sabotage" of a peaceful Middle East settlement "has now received open encouragement" from Washington. The State Department statement has "caused all the greater concern," said TASS, since it came immediately after the UAR Government's announced agreement to "prolong" the cease-fire arrangement.

Reporting from New York TASS promptly noted Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's welcome of the U.S. decision to suspend the talks of the deputy delegates and his remark that the American announcement indicates that Israeli and U.S. positions on the Middle East now coincide.

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TASS also reported the French ambassador to the United Nations as deploring the U.S. action and stating that the French Government did not give its consent to this step.

In the past, Soviet propaganda did not touch on the activities of the deputy delegates, confining itself to standardized, terse TASS announcements of the meetings of the Big Four UN ambassadors "to discuss a peaceful political settlement" in the Middle East.

The four-power talks have been given little propaganda attention in the past few weeks: Most recently, Podgornyy, in a 6 October speech at a dinner honoring French President Pompidou, declared that "like the French Government, we urge that considerably greater effectiveness be given to exchanges of views of the four sides" aimed at complete realization of Resolution 242. The only other available recent reference to Big Four consultations came in a broadcast of Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress in English to Africa on the 5th, which asserted that "the public expects" that Jarring must receive "some sort of coordinated recommendation from the Big Four." This suggestion, advanced by Nasir in his 23 July speech, was brought up at least once by Moscow, in a commentators' roundtable program on the domestic service in late August, when a panelist commented that if the Big Four were to promote the reaching of a political settlement it could become a fact, and that for Jarring's mission to be successful it was necessary to give him a "practical program of action."

BREZHNEV SAYS "ANY" INTERVENTION IN JORDAN INADMISSIBLE

In his speech in Baku on 2 October, Brezhnev pointed to Israeli "satisfaction" with the fratricidal conflict in Jordan and accused the "imperialists" of using the opportunity to "bring their forces forward" in expectation of a possibility of new military interference in the Arabs' affairs to "strangle" their liberation movement and rob their natural resources. He cautioned that "such a cynical game" is dangerous, and could result not only in "burning one's fingers, but--who knows--even losing one's arm."

As for the Soviet Union, he said, it took all possible means to achieve a halt to the fighting in Jordan, including the "discontinuation of the annihilation of detachments of the Palestinian resistance movement." (The accusation by Nasir, in his 26 September letter to Husayn, that "despite every claim to the contrary there is a plan to liquidate the Palestinian resistance," was factually reported by Moscow in an Arabic-language broadcast on the 26th but

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not featured in other comment, nor has Brezhnev's remark subsequently been replayed.) Earlier in his remarks on Jordan, Brezhnev had observed that the clashes in Jordan harmed the common cause of the Arab peoples, "including the cause of the Palestinian Arabs."

Brezhnev declared the Soviet belief that "any" foreign military intervention in the events in Jordan is "absolutely inadmissible." And he again reiterated Soviet urgings for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict, declaring that the main task of all freedom- and peace-loving forces in the Middle East lies in achieving a "peaceful settlement through political means," removing the consequences of the "Israeli aggression" and bringing peace and calm to "all peoples of the region."

Soviet comment apportions the credit for easing the crisis between the Arab leaders who met in Cairo--with acknowledgments of Nasir's "great role" in the last hours of his life--and the Soviet Union's own "active foreign political steps" to prevent the conflict from spreading. Propagandists, continuing to accuse "certain Western powers" as well as Israel of having desired to intervene in furtherance of their own aims, echo Brezhnev's remarks on the inadmissibility of foreign interference. Reportage continues to follow the developments in the situation in an even-handed fashion.

SOVIET TASS on the 5th reported that planes with food, medicines, AID blankets and tents are arriving in Amman from "various countries" and that the cargoes include medicines and other goods sent to Jordan by the Soviet Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent. Moscow on 28 September had first reported Soviet aid, saying that the Soviet Red Cross had informed the Jordanian Red Crescent of a decision to send assistance and of its "consideration" of the "Jordanian side's request" for food. TASS on 2 October, in an item referring to essentially the same assistance as mentioned in the initial report, said the aid was in response to requests by the Jordanian "and Palestinian" Red Crescent societies.

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NIXON TRIP

MOSCOW SUSTAINS ATTACK ON MEDITERRANEAN "SHOW OF FORCE"

Moscow propaganda on the windup of President Nixon's nine-day trip to Europe (27 September-5 October) continues to portray the tour as aimed at a show of force in the Mediterranean and the Middle East detrimental to the cause of peace. In this vein, TASS commentator Chukseyev on the 6th cites AP for the observation that world public opinion regards the tour as an attempt to emphasize the United States' intention to retain its "military presence" in the Mediterranean. From the very beginning, the commentator says, the trip "served the aims of an open show of force which was particularly manifest during the President's visit to warships of the Sixth Fleet."

Another TASS dispatch on the 6th, reporting the President's 4 October press conference in Limerick, Ireland, says he spoke not about U.S.-Irish relations but about the Sixth Fleet, thus "confirming" that the aim of the trip was to display the strength of the United States in the Mediterranean. The dispatch says the President declared that "if some other powers or other navies threaten the position of strength" of the Sixth Fleet, the United States "must be ready to take actions to preserve 'the supremacy of this fleet.'" Citing the U.S. press, the dispatch concludes that the President "cannot imagine negotiations other than those held from a position of strength" and that he has "picked up where Dulles left off."

A foreign-language commentary on 5 October, rejecting the contention of U.S. "propaganda" that the trip represents a "historic peace mission," says the President "openly showed his intention to act from a position of strength on the basis of diktat and pressure" and contradicted "Washington's alleged desires" to strengthen peace.

Soviet propagandists continue to charge that a second aim of the trip was to counteract the "trend toward detente" in the north of Europe. A participant in the 4 October domestic service commentators' roundtable, for example, said that in Washington's view the trend toward relaxation--manifested, among other things, by the signing of the FRG-

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Soviet treaty and favorably developing French-Soviet relations--- "spells doom" for NATO and that the task of U.S. diplomacy is to halt this progress. A PRAVDA article reviewed by TASS on the 6th says that the results of the President's talks with British Prime Minister Heath show a continuing U.S. effort to "torpedo" a European security conference. And the 6 October TASS report by Chukseyev says President Nixon revealed that he had "stated categorically to the NATO command [in Italy] that under no circumstances would the United States curtail its NATO commitments unilaterally." TASS quotes the Washington STAR for the comment that this statement "was obviously spearheaded against demands of American congressmen to diminish contingents of American troops in Western Europe."

COMMENT FROM Moscow's hardcore allies, in a limited amount
EAST EUROPE of press and radio comment, have generally
depreciated the President's tour as an exercise
in domestic electoral politics and as a cold war anachronism
that runs counter to efforts to promote East-West detente.

Sofia's BTA press review on 6 October says the Bulgarian press viewed the trip as "in sharp contrast to the trends toward establishment of an atmosphere of security and cooperation among states." It goes on to quote the Bulgarian trade union organ TRUD's comment that "the President has set up additional obstacles on the road toward calling a conference on European security, for which the United States shows no sympathy at all."

In a more general appraisal, a 28 September Radio Prague commentary laments that the trip ran counter to "the efforts of the democratic forces on the European continent which are trying to create an atmosphere of trust and develop constructive, peaceful cooperation among all European nations." In the same vein, a commentary on the presidential tour in the Polish party organ TRYBUNA LUDU on 6 October says that the U.S. "demonstration of force was in flagrant contradiction to the idea of negotiations which should replace the era of confrontation," adding that it confirms "the crisis of concepts guiding the White House insofar as Europe and the Arab world are concerned." Similarly, a 3 October article in the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG observes that the American electorate will have the opportunity to judge the Administration's "demonstration of force" policy in the forthcoming elections; it adds that the European peoples "have already expressed their aversion to this policy and . . . are ready to support acts now in progress for peace and security on our continent."

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East Berlin media, taking a typically hostile view of East-West relations, has assailed the tour as "blackmail in the Mediterranean and a return to the times of the cold war." The party organ *DEUTSCHE DEUTSCHLAND* on 6 October says the President's "threat that the U.S. Sixth Fleet would fulfill its 'deterrent mission' in the Mediterranean was taken from the vocabulary of the late Mr. Dulles," and "the renewed flirting with fascist dictators in Greece and Spain is characteristic of Nixon's aims and his 'peace structure' for the Mediterranean region."

ROMANIAN COVERAGE Against the background of Soviet criticism of the tour and Bucharest's improved relations with the United States and cordial relations with Belgrade, Radio Bucharest and the Romanian daily press limited their coverage to factual reports of the progress of the trip, without comment. The only press article on the visit appeared in the 1 October issue of the weekly current affairs journal *LUMEA*. The journal reviewed various motives ascribed to the journey, including the alleged American desire for a show of force in the Mediterranean and domestic electoral considerations.

YUGOSLAV VISIT PLAYED DOWN BY SOVIET BLOC, ATTACKED BY TIRANA

Moscow commentators were silent on the Yugoslav leg of the tour, which has also largely been ignored in the media of the East European allies. There were, however, brief comments from Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest. Radio Warsaw reported under a New York dateline on 1 October that UN diplomatic circles had reacted with "astonishment" and "disappointment" to the fact that Tito "chose to entertain the U.S. President instead of leaving for Cairo to take part in the funeral of his closest friend." And Prague's *LIDOVA DEMOCRACIE* on 2 October, remarking that Tito is known for his sympathy for the Arabs, commented that his "dialogue with Nixon could be the only bright spot on the President's trip." A Budapest *MTI* dispatch from Washington on 5 October made a similar point in reporting that "it was only with President Tito that Nixon had political talks of any value."

Tirana, playing its customary anti-imperialist theme in condemning the President's tour as still another example of "U.S. aggressive policy and diplomacy," at the same time manifested some bitterness over the Yugoslav leg of the journey. A lengthy article in the 30 September issue of the party organ *ZERI I POPULLIT* comments that although the United States has no military bases in Yugoslavia,

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"U.S. capital has deeply penetrated the country, suffocating its economy with colossal debts, and Nixon wants Yugoslavia on his side to play its part in the interests of the Americans in the third world, in the Arab countries, and in East-West relations."

In line with Tirana's recently improved state relations with Belgrade, the paper confidently predicts that "the freedom-loving and patriotic Yugoslav people" will "never allow themselves to go either on the side of U.S. imperialism or on the side of the Soviet social imperialism."

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

USSR NOTE TO U.S. PROTESTS ANTI-SOVIET ACTIONS BY "ZIONISTS"

Moscow media widely publicize the Soviet Government note of 1 October protesting the "inaction of the American authorities" against an "unbridled anti-Soviet campaign" being undertaken in the United States "by Zionist organizations" and warning that such inaction "can have unfavorable consequences for relations between our two states." The note singles out "the so-called 'Jewish Defense League'" in saying that provocations have obstructed the functioning of Soviet institutions in the United States and endangered the personal security of Soviet diplomatic and other representatives and citizens. The reason for the protest at this time is not clear, but the fact that the note is at the government level* and that there has been no followup substantive comment suggests genuine concern for the security of Soviet officials in the United States rather than merely a desire to score propaganda points.

The note says "it is common knowledge" that the Soviet embassy and officials at the United Nations have lodged "resolute protests" and that representations have been made to the U.S. embassy in Moscow by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to no avail. The only recent such protest known to have been publicized in Moscow media was in connection with the disruption of a performance by the Moyseyev dance company in Chicago on 26 August. TASS reported on the 28th that the Soviet embassy in Washington had lodged "a resolute protest" against the Chicago incident. While Soviet comment on this incident did not raise the question of Zionists, other propaganda during recent months has done so. A 30 August IZVESTIYA article on a demonstration by the Jewish Defense League in Washington called on U.S. authorities to stop evading their obligations to guard foreign representatives and citizens against provocative and violent actions by that

* The bombing of the Soviet embassy in Washington on 21 February 1968 prompted a Soviet protest on that day at the foreign ministry level. See the FBIS SURVEY of 29 February 1968, pages 1-2.

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organization. And a PRAVDA article on 30 July accused U.S. authorities of "connivance" with "fascist and Zionist elements" in "provocative anti-Soviet sorties" against the Soviet UN delegation.

While the current protest has been widely broadcast by Radio Moscow to foreign as well as domestic audiences, the only known reference to it in subsequent propaganda is in a note prefacing a domestic service commentary on 1 October which views congressional action on the military procurement bill as evidence of Washington's "ardor and solidarity with the Tel Aviv hawks." Observing that "all news agencies reported the full text or summaries" of the Soviet Government protest, the prefatory note says "progressive political observers" point out that giving freedom of action to Zionist elements who continue provocative actions against Soviet representatives is a direct extension of U.S. support for Israeli extremists.

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USSR AND CUBA

MOSCOW OBSCURES THRUST OF U.S. WARNING IN BELATED REACTION

Soviet media have reacted belatedly to the warning by a White House official on 25 September, publicized in the U.S. press on the 26th, that the United States would regard any Soviet attempt to establish a strategic naval base in the Caribbean with "utmost seriousness." Moscow has impugned Washington's motives while largely obscuring the thrust of the warning. The first and most authoritative Soviet reaction came on 30 September, in a PRAVDA article by Ratiani which addressed itself vaguely to "the ballyhoo over some sort of preparations in Cuba which allegedly threaten 'U.S. security.'" The basis for the U.S. warning was acknowledged--backhandedly--only on 5 October when TASS reported Senator Fulbright as saying that "the Nixon Administration is misleading the American people by his warnings on the construction of a base for Soviet submarines in Cuba" in order to create public pressure on Congress to authorize more generous defense appropriations.

The Ratiani article called the furor over "some sort of preparations in Cuba" part of a "propaganda campaign" connected with the November congressional elections. This campaign, Ratiani charged, was aimed at "artificially aggravating the international situation," engendering "an atmosphere of military hysteria" in the United States, and putting "political pressure" on other capitalist states to increase their "military contribution." Moscow gave the Ratiani article very limited distribution: TASS carried a summary, and a slightly longer summary was broadcast by Radio Moscow only in English to North America.

Another Radio Moscow allusion to the U.S. warning on 30 September was even more oblique than Ratiani's. A commentary beamed widely to foreign audiences, discussing President Nixon's remarks on board the aircraft carrier Saratoga during his European tour, made a passing reference to a U.S. propaganda "uproar about a threat to the security of the United States in the area of the Caribbean Sea," charging that "on the basis of this alleged danger, the U.S. ruling quarters are . . . creating an atmosphere charged with war hysteria."

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A commentary for Latin American audiences over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on the same day was only slightly more explicit, stating that in an effort "to deceive Latin American public opinion" Washington "launched a tale of so-called danger to the Caribbean countries from the Soviet fleet and some secret bases in this part of the world." This "Yankee trick," the broadcast alleged, is related to Washington's fear that Latin Americans would demand "dismantling of the many military bases which the United States has in Latin America, liquidating the great danger that the U.S. military presence poses for the security and existence of the peoples of Latin America."

HAVANA BARELY MENTIONS ISSUE, DOWNPLAYS SOVIET NAVAL SQUADRON

The only monitored Cuban reference to U.S. concern over the Caribbean base question since the White House statement was issued appeared on 1 October, in a domestic radio commentary which noted that the U.S. press "has been giving wide play to the submarine base that they say the Soviets are building in Cienfuegos."

The only other monitored reference in Havana media to the possible establishment of a Soviet naval base in Cuba appeared in a 5 September broadcast which mentioned "funny statements" about "alleged" Soviet naval activities in the Caribbean and went on to cite the U.S. Caribbean fleet commander as stating that the USSR might install a naval base in Cuba. If this occurred, the broadcast quoted the fleet commander as saying, "the U.S. Navy would be forced to increase its naval force in the Caribbean and especially in Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico." This remark and a reference by Defense Secretary Laird to the movement of a fleet of Soviet ships toward the Caribbean area, the broadcast said, were ploys to justify increases in U.S. "repressive forces in the continent and especially in the Caribbean, where Cuba is located." The commentary drew a connection between this "cheap North American campaign" and a concurrent announcement by Cuban exiles "in the pay of the CIA" about a projected "new invasion of Cuba."

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Four days later, on 9 September, Havana media reported the arrival of a Soviet naval task force--the third to visit Cuba since July 1968--at the port of Cienfuegos, where it was welcomed by Cuban Navy Commander Aldo Santamaria. The initial Cuban report described the squadron as consisting of "two antisubmarine ships, a submarine tender, a landing ship tank, a hydrographic service ship, a tugboat, and an oiler." In subsequent broadcasts Havana simply referred to the presence of "two missile ships and support ships." The task force was given little publicity after its arrival, as compared with sustained coverage of the activities of the Soviet naval squadrons that visited Cuba in July 1968 and this May. The squadron that was sent in May, including a nuclear submarine, visited Cienfuegos and was given prominent publicity in Cuban media during its 15-day stay in Cuban waters. The last available reference to the squadron that arrived on 9 September was monitored on 14 September, when Havana reported that the sailors toured Las Villas Province Central University.

There have been only scattered, innocuous references to the naval detachment's visit in Moscow newscasts. A radio report on 11 September noted that the people of Cienfuegos had given "the squadron of Soviet warships" a "cordial, fraternal welcome," and a 13 September report said the seamen were continuing to "acquaint themselves with life in Cuba." Moscow's reports have given no indication of the planned length of the squadron's stay.

CASTRO In his 28 September address marking the 10th
SPEECHES anniversary of the founding of the Committee
for the Defense of the Revolution, Fidel Castro concentrated on problems of labor discipline and did not allude to the bases issue. However, in two speeches in the last six months he has brought up Soviet-Cuban military relations, indicating that he hopes to see them expanded. Speaking on 23 August, he stressed Cuba's willingness "to establish, if possible, even more military ties with the Soviet Union."* And in his 22 April Lenin Day address, he

* For a discussion of the 23 August speech and a brief review of recent propaganda on Soviet-Cuban military relations, see the TRENDS of 2 September 1970, pages 31-35.

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asserted that he would "always be ready to have closer military ties with the Soviet Union." Castro shed some light on the kinds of "ties" he had in mind when he argued in the 23 August speech that if Cuba had "bomber squadrons," nearby Caribbean states would be deterred from providing bases for exile attacks on Cuba; he had made a similar point in a 19 May speech greeting returning Cuban fishermen who had been abducted to the Bahamas by an exile organization.

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SOVIET-FRG RELATIONS

SOVIET LEADERS CONTINUE TO HAIL AUGUST TREATY

As Soviet propaganda fanfare over the 12 August FRG-Soviet treaty continues, Brezhnev again lauded the treaty in his Baku speech on 2 October, calling it "an important success" of the USSR's peace-loving policy. In the vein of his 28 August speech at Alma-Ata--in which he had discussed the treaty at somewhat greater length--he said the accord represents a gain "equally" for the FRG, the socialist countries, and all those interested in easing international tension. Brezhnev rejected as "unfounded" the arguments expressed "here and there" about which side had gained more from the treaty, in what might be read as a barb directed at dissident elements in the GDR. But the 6 October IZVESTIYA editorial, in paraphrasing the speech, refers to such arguments "in some circles in the West."

Declaring that the peace-loving forces in Europe must make use of the more favorable situation by taking concrete steps to further strengthen European security, the Soviet leader repeated the call for a European security conference. And as in the 28 August speech, he observed that the importance of the treaty will be enhanced after it has been ratified and comes into force. Some of Moscow's followup comment on the Baku address picks up Brezhnev's remark on ratification.

Podgorny touched briefly on the treaty in his 6 October speech at a Kremlin dinner in honor of visiting French President Pompidou. According to the TASS summary, he welcomed the French Government's favorable attitude toward the pact and observed that "there is no doubt that Soviet-French cooperation also gains from this important act in European policy."

BERLIN Soviet propaganda since the 12 August signing of the
ISSUE treaty has maintained virtual silence on the Brandt
 government's contention that ratification is contingent
on progress on the Berlin problem. Moscow has also failed to
report remarks by PRAVDA observer Yuriy Zhukov on a West German
television show on 27 September which seemed to reverse the
linkage. Hamburg's DPA reported on that day that Zhukov--
visiting West Germany in his capacity as a member of the
Supreme Soviet's Foreign Affairs Committee--said ratification
of the accord would "contribute to finding a satisfactory

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solution to a number of questions, namely in the Berlin issue." And in an interview carried in Hamburg's DER STERN on 4 October, Zhukov rejected the notion that a settlement of the Berlin problem would be "decisive" for Bundestag ratification of the treaty. Answering a question about the correctness of this view, he quoted Brandt for the statement that the treaty will itself "promote the negotiations of the four powers for a satisfactory arrangement in and around Berlin." Given good will, he continued, a satisfactory solution can be found at the four-power talks.

In characteristically brief fashion, TASS on 30 September reported that the Big Four ambassadors held their seventh meeting earlier in the day "within the framework of exchange of views," noting that the communique on the meeting stated that the next one would be held on 9 October. In the only available followup comment, a Voronov article in PRAVDA on the 4th said that the USSR considers an improvement in the situation to be "of no small importance for the relaxation of tension in Europe." Everything depends, Voronov added, on "good will," on the readiness of the interested sides to "take realities into account," and on preventing "the interference of outside forces in the affairs of West Berlin."

Voronov argued that the situation remains unsettled not because of any lack of desire for a solution on the part of the socialist countries but because of the attitude of circles in NATO, and particularly in the FRG, for whom West Berlin is a place for "organizing all kinds of political provocations and subversive activity." He remarked that "certain CDU/CSU leaders" and the Springer press are propagandizing the need "to advance every kind of unfounded maximalist demand as almost the only method of conducting affairs with the socialist countries." Such an approach, Voronov concluded, has "no chance of success."

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

BUDAPEST MEETING ANTICIPATES "ANTI-IMPERIALIST" CONCLAVE

Soviet and other communist media have revealed little about the nature and composition of a 28-30 September meeting of 45 communist parties in Budapest, implying but not stating in so many words that the gathering was connected with the decision of the June 1969 Moscow international communist party conference to prepare a broader world conference of communist parties along with other "anti-imperialist" forces. The reticence seems attributable to a concern to avoid repetition of the embarrassment to Moscow which resulted from the freely aired controversy surrounding preparations for last year's CP conference.

At the February-March 1968 Budapest "consultative" meeting in preparation for the June 1969 conference, the Romanians--like the absent Yugoslavs in their radio and press--had urged that the projected Moscow conference also include noncommunist "anti-imperialist" forces. This idea was endorsed by some of the nonruling parties, but the Soviet position prevailed: there must first be a communist party conference, and only afterward could a broader "anti-imperialist congress" be held. The main document of the June 1969 conference and the final conference communique dealt only in general terms with the subject of anti-imperialist unity, saying nothing about a congress. But TASS' account of the 17 June final session said the conference had "unanimously" decided to "convene a world anti-imperialist congress" and appointed a 13-member commission to prepare it. "All" parties wishing to participate in the commission's work, TASS said, were invited to do so.

In June of this year, the Australian CP paper TRIBUNE said the preparatory commission for the anti-imperialist congress would meet "in September." On 26 September, two days before the opening of the latest Budapest meeting, the Japanese CP daily AKAHATA carried an unsigned article reiterating the JCP's opposition to an anti-imperialist gathering as proposed by the June 1969 Moscow conference.

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COMMUNIQUE ON BUDAPEST TALKS 'The brief communique on the Budapest session, carried on 30 September by MTT and Radio Moscow and published on the front pages of PRAVDA and European ruling party dailies the next day, says "45 communist and workers' parties"--not identified--"exchanged views in Budapest about some topical questions regarding the anti-imperialist struggle." The participants reportedly expressed readiness "to make efforts" to strengthen the cohesion of communists "and other anti-imperialist organizations," to expand cooperation "on the basis of equality," and to strengthen solidarity in the "joint" anti-imperialist struggle. In low-keyed terms similar to those appearing in the final communique of the June 1969 conference, the communique says the Budapest meeting was held in an atmosphere of "objectivity, in a spirit of comradeship and solidarity."

Soviet media on 2 October reported the return home of CPSU Secretary Ponomarev, after heading the CPSU delegation to the Budapest meeting, but Moscow's allies among the European ruling parties have not identified their participants. The Yugoslavs--participating in the latest meeting after having boycotted the June 1969 conference and its preparatory sessions--reported on the 2d that their delegation was led by Drago Kunc, head of the LCY Presidium's international department. L'UNITA on 1 October and L'HUMANITE the next day identified the Italian and French CP delegation heads as Mechini and Kanapa, respectively--both Central Committee members. The Yugoslav and Western CP reports reveal little else, beyond the substance of the meeting's communique.

FOLLOWUP COMMENT In the only monitored commentary on the meeting from a communist source, broadcast in the Moscow domestic service on 1 October, Viktor Levin called the gathering "one of the concrete acts implementing the decision" of last year's Moscow conference, recalling that the main conference document had called for "unity of action" of "all anti-imperialist forces."

Levin said the Budapest meeting exemplified the June 1969 conference standpoint that the solidarity of the communist parties is "the most important factor in uniting all anti-imperialist forces." He claimed "very positive results" on this score from bilateral and multilateral CP meetings held since the Moscow conference. Continued Soviet sensitivity on the Czechoslovak episode was displayed in

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this connection as Levin noted that representatives of "a number" of West European CP's had met with the CPCZ leaders in the post-conference period; these meetings enabled the parties to "obtain reliable and objective information on the events of 1968," leading to "the elimination of misunderstanding." Levin stressed that "the expansion of interparty relations" leads to enhancement of a party's "international authority" and of "its role as a really revolutionary national force."

An International Review by Korionov in the 4 October PRAVDA, on the theme of strengthening the forces of peace, contains Moscow's only other mention of the Budapest meeting--a passing reference which amounts to little more than a paraphrase of parts of the communique. An article on the Hungarian party's role in the international communist movement by Garai, deputy head of the MSZMP Central Committee's foreign affairs department--who may have represented his party at the Budapest meeting--includes a general reference to the desirability of convening "a conference" but does not mention the Budapest meeting or indicate what kind of conference is envisaged.

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PRC NATIONAL DAY

CHEN PO-TA ABSENT FROM ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS IN PEKING

Adhering to the National Day pattern followed since 1966, Communist China marked the 21st anniversary of its founding on 1 October with a speech by Chou En-lai on the eve, a daytime rally attended by Mao and addressed by Lin Biao, and a joint RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial.

Two Politburo members who were leading celebrants last year failed to appear this time. Hsieh Fu-chih, who served as rally host last year, continued his absence, which has now lasted over six months. Also missing was Standing Committee member Chen Po-ta, long a close associate of Mao and generally considered a leader of Peking's "leftist" faction, who has not appeared in public since July. The four other Politburo members not present in Peking were subsequently accounted for by NCNA as leaders of provincial rallies.

This time NCNA did not follow the forms used last year to explain absences. In 1969 it was said that the list of Central Committee members did not include "those on leave due to work or illness" and that the list of Politburo members at the evening rally omitted "those absent due to work." Chen Po-ta's absence is somewhat glossed over in the NCNA account on 1 October, which lumps Standing Committee members with other members of the Politburo in Chinese stroke order, unlike the live radio account which followed the usual custom and singled out the Standing Committee. Only in a list immediately following the Party Congress in April 1969 had the Politburo previously been listed in this fashion, and even then the list followed a separate roster of the Standing Committee members.

The new NCNA system again emphasizes the qualitative difference between Mao and Lin and the other Chinese leaders, a difference heightened by a new title accorded them in the principal NCNA account of the rally. Mao and Lin are now respectively "supreme commander" and "deputy supreme commander of the whole nation and the whole army," a formulation added to the usual phrases hailing their

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leadership of the Central Committee and the PLA. So far the new formulation has been reiterated at the provincial level only in Chekiang, where Chairman Nan Ping used it in his rally speech.

The NCNA list of leaders attending local affairs contains a number of changes from last year's list of secondary provincial figures. Also, in addition to the two provincial chiefs not appearing last year and presumably purged--Liu Ko-ping in Shansi and Li Tsai-han in Kweichow--there were two new though predictable absentees, with Teng Hai-ching in Inner Mongolia and Wang Hsiao-yu in Shantung continuing their now year-long absence. The highest ranking interprovincial transfers to surface during this period are the move of Fukien first vice-chairman Pi Ting-chun to new duties in Lanchow and the appearance in Fukien of former Shantung first secretary Tan Chi-lung. Tan was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee in April 1969 and now, with the assumption of new duties, has apparently been fully rehabilitated.

POLICIES, While neither the joint editorial nor the two
PROBLEMS major speeches signal domestic policy shifts,
they are noteworthy for certain economic claims.
The speeches contain the first national-level references to a forthcoming fourth five-year plan, with both Chou and Lin urging increased efforts "to lay a sound foundation for carrying out the fourth five-year plan." The joint editorial makes the first central claim that the national economic plan for 1970 is "being successfully fulfilled" along with the third five-year plan which began in 1966.

The editorial, more centered on domestic problems than last year's, specifically reminds senior cadres of the "heavy tasks of leadership" required in "revolution and construction." Senior cadres "in particular," the editorial declares, must assume more responsibility for "improving local leadership" to enable party organizations and revolutionary committees to complete the "thousand and one things" still confronting them. Only vague incantations for more Mao study are offered for guidance, however, as the editorial fails to provide specific guidelines for government or party reconstruction. The editorial does ask that preparations be made for the fourth NPC, formally proposed by the recent CCP plenum communique, as well as for fulfillment of party building tasks and an increase in "the party's centralized leadership

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over all fronts." Apart from the apparent difficulties in establishing the leadership authority of rectified party committees, actual rebuilding of new party units above the county level has come to a full stop, judging by the propaganda. In fact, 12 of the PRC's 29 major administrative units still have not even publicized a rebuilt party committee at the county level.

BLAND TREATMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MIRRORS REDUCED TENSIONS

Peking's lackluster treatment of foreign affairs on the 1 October anniversary reflects the significant reduction in the Sino-Soviet tensions that figured prominently in last year's pronouncements. The basic scripture this year was drawn from Mao's 20 May statement declaring that the danger of a new world war "still exists" but that "revolution is the main trend" in the world today. Last year the Chinese expressed concern over Soviet intentions, mentioning "nuclear blackmail" and "war threats" and citing a statement by Mao regarding the Chinese defensive posture. This year's pronouncements refer to the United States and "social imperialism" as the two super-powers seeking to exert dominant influence in the world rather than as threats to the PRC's security.

Peking's resurgent diplomatic activity in the past year is reflected in Lin Biao's speech, which repeats the claims in the 6 September CCP Central Committee plenum communique that the PRC's foreign relations are "daily developing" and that the Chinese have "friends all over the world." It is a measure of this progress that messages addressed to the Mao-Lin-Chou trinity were received from Romania and the DPRK as well as from such old friends as Albania and the DRV. Last year the former pair sent messages from their respective premiers to Chou alone, thereby failing to acknowledge satisfactory party relations.

Peking as usual publicized the messages from Moscow and its orthodox allies, which again limited their greetings to the state level in line with the precedent established in 1968, after the Chinese had omitted the party from their message on the October Revolution anniversary the previous year. The Hungarian and GDR messages are again,

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as last year, a shade warmer than the others in that they wish the Chinese success in building socialism, a subject ignored in the other greetings.

GREETINGS FROM While mild in discussing the Soviets in its
MILITANT GROUPS own name, Peking has given vent to old ideological animosities by publicizing messages from militant parties containing sharp anti-Soviet attacks and claims in behalf of Peking's pre-eminence in the communist movement. The Albanian message, carried by NCNA on 30 September, includes the standard denunciation of "modern revisionism headed by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique." Peking has also seen fit--despite having recently assigned an ambassador to Warsaw--to publicize in both domestic and international media a message from Kazimierz Mijal, secretary general of "the Communist Party of Poland" and the source of venomous attacks on the Gomulka regime that have been broadcast by Radio Tirana in Polish. The message denounces the Polish "renegades" who have become "faithful flunkies of the Soviet social imperialism."

Among messages from parties that are today more Maoist than the Chinese themselves is one from the Ceylonese communist Samugathasan hailing Mao as the greatest Marxist-Leninist of the present era and calling China the center of world revolution--claims Peking had advanced at the height of the cultural revolution. A message from the pro-Peking Italian communists expresses concern over a blurring of the "line of demarcation between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism" which the Chinese had drawn so sharply during the polemical struggles of the 1960's. Peking's publicity for these messages--affording the senders a forum for airing themes the Chinese themselves have muted or shelved--may be viewed as a gesture of support for the Maoist foreign legions, who might be subject to demoralization as Peking departs from rigidly intransigent positions, and as an effort to preserve assets in which the Chinese have invested for their ideological rivalry with Moscow and for exerting pressure on foreign countries.*

* A barometer for measuring the relative importance of the diplomatic and revolutionary aspects of Peking's line is its policy toward Burma, which has ranged from cultivation of friendly bilateral relations to promotion of a communist-led armed insurgency. In the latest phase Peking has muted its attacks on the Ne Win regime while continuing to support the Burmese communists. On National Day the Chinese balanced the announced presence of a Burmese CP delegation at the Peking celebrations with a report on a message from Ne Win to Chou En-lai.

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MOSCOW RENEWS APPEAL FOR NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS

Moscow has used the PRC's National Day to reassert its conciliatory line calling for normalization of state relations and settlement of divisive issues through the Peking talks. An appeal for restoration of friendly relations contained in the Soviet message, again addressed impersonally from the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers to PRC state bodies, is reinforced this year by nonpolemical articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA stressing Moscow's role in seeking an accommodation with the Chinese. Soviet press comment last year was limited to the weekly NEW TIMES, which took the occasion to blame Peking's anti-Soviet line on the Chinese leaders' "nationalist narrowmindedness."

Moscow and Peking both reported that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rodionov attended the PRC embassy reception in Moscow, but they failed to note the presence of the newly appointed Soviet ambassador, V. Tolstikov (whose attendance was noted in a VNA information dispatch to its Hanoi office). Last year Moscow did not report who attended the Chinese reception. Moscow's brief account of the Peking celebrations, published in the press on 2 October, noted without comment that a meeting and a parade were held, ignoring Lin Piao's speech altogether.

The Soviet message, like the supporting comment, follows the lines of Brezhnev's 28 August Alma-Ata speech in calling for normalization of state relations, restoration of good-neighborly relations, and unity of efforts in opposing imperialism. Last year's message, which appeared in the period between the Kosygin-Chou meeting and the announcement of agreement to open talks, seemed tailored for those circumstances in calling for "all-round cooperation" between the two countries--Moscow's broader goal for the talks--and for settlement of disputed questions through "talks and consultations," a formulation which reappears now in the IZVESTIYA article.

Both the PRAVDA article, by M. Domogatskikh, the paper's correspondent in Peking during the 1950's, and the IZVESTIYA article, by G. Apalin and F. Strokach, stress that it was at Soviet initiative that the Peking talks were opened and cite Brezhnev's enunciation of Moscow's aims in his Alma-Ata speech. Neither article raises charges made by the Soviet leaders in June that the Chinese have been responsible for

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dragging out the talks. But apart from noting that the talks are continuing, the only progress to which the Soviets point is an agreement--mentioned in the IZVESTIYA article--to exchange ambassadors. This represents the first confirmation in Soviet media that the Chinese have agreed to assign an ambassador to Moscow.*

Both articles, while observing blandly that relations between the two countries had deteriorated after a promising start, avoid attacking Chinese policies. However, the IZVESTIYA article takes a rather heavy-handed tack in noting that the Chinese "communists-internationalists"--a code term for pro-Soviet elements opposed to Maoist nationalism--had viewed the Soviet Union as a "prototype of the future world." IZVESTIYA's observation betrays a nostalgia for Moscow's patriarchal role in the communist movement and an insensitivity to the sort of Chinese pride that lies at the heart of the Sino-Soviet schism.

Apart from underlining Moscow's desire for improved relations with Peking, the Soviet treatment of PRC National Day reflects the political and diplomatic gains made by Moscow in the past year in reducing the burden of Sino-Soviet tensions, notwithstanding the apparent lack of momentum at the nearly year-old Peking talks. Moscow has sought to defuse the border dispute,** thereby reducing the pressures from that sector and taking the sting out of Peking's charges against Moscow for practicing "social imperialism." Though there was an upsurge of polemics in the first few months of this year and occasional outbursts like the Chinese attack last month on the Soviet-FRG treaty, Peking has significantly muted its anti-Soviet propaganda and has largely discarded its portrayal of a Soviet-U.S. encirclement of China.

* Kosygin had confirmed the agreement in an interview published in the Indian PATRIOT on 10 August, but the substance of the interview was not carried in Soviet media.

** In a pamphlet (signed to press 22 June 1970) assailing Mao's regime for turning against the Soviets, M.A. Kapitsa said the Soviet border authorities "are being very careful" to foster a tranquil atmosphere on the border and to exclude the use of arms.

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Given the calmer atmosphere in Sino-Soviet relations, Moscow has shifted the blame onto the West for seeking to foment and exploit tensions in communist ranks. Thus, the IZVESTIYA article, after taking note of the Peking talks and the agreement to exchange ambassadors, aims a rebuke at the "imperialists" for desiring a deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and seeking to poison the atmosphere by fabricating "various kinds of provocative" stories. The article does not specify the stories in question, but in the past Moscow has denounced Western speculation about Soviet troop deployments along the Chinese border, and Brezhnev made a point of denying that the treaty with the PRC was concluded in order to free the Soviets to increase pressure on China.

BROADCASTS TO CHINA Characteristically, much that is left unsaid in comment appearing in Soviet central media is aired in broadcasts to the Chinese. Radio Moscow on 30 September broadcast a lengthy account in Mandarin of a meeting in Moscow sponsored by two Soviet "public" organizations to mark PRC National Day. A TASS report carried in IZVESTIYA on 1 October noted only that such a meeting had been held. According to the broadcast account, a report delivered at the meeting expressed regret that the Peking talks "are going very slowly" and that Chinese propaganda has promoted "a new anti-Soviet movement" which is not in the interest of the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.

In reviewing the early phase of the PRC's existence, the report delivered at the Moscow meeting referred to the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance, which in recent years has been treated by Moscow and Peking as a dead letter. Because of the treaty, the report observed, the PRC in its early days was able to rely on the might and influence of the socialist camp; typically, as quoted in the broadcast, the report left open the current status of the treaty. The Soviet press articles on the anniversary do not mention the treaty, making only vague references to bonds of "friendship" between the two countries and to the value in the early years of the PRC's "alliance with the socialist countries."

Moscow has generally avoided the border question, but a Mandarin broadcast to Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia chided Peking for abandoning its allegiance to the five

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principles of peaceful coexistence by engaging in border conflicts with India in 1959 and 1962 and with the Soviet Union in 1969. Moscow has not been heard to raise the border question in the current context, however.

While Moscow has also shied away from attacking Mao, a Soviet broadcast in Mandarin on 5 October quoted from a Bulgarian article likening Mao to Trotsky as a left deviationist. By citing a Bulgarian source calling for struggle against Maoism, Moscow was able to remind the Chinese of the ideological tensions associated with Mao without engaging in a direct polemical attack in its own name. Consistent with this restraint, a commentary broadcast in Radio Moscow's program for the PLA on 6 October managed to avoid naming Mao while deploring the personality cult in China and the demands placed on the PLA to show loyalty to "one person" rather than to the party and country. The commentary also played a favorite theme in comment tailored for the PLA by reminding the Chinese military of the Soviet aid and modern weaponry that has not been available because of the PRC's estrangement from the socialist camp.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

BREZHNEV SCORES PROTOCOL GAINS AT ANNIVERSARY FETES

A comparison of central press coverage of the 50th anniversaries of the Ukraine and Belorussia in 1967-68 with coverage of the recent 50th anniversaries of Kazakhstan and Azerbaydzhan reveals a distinct enhancement of Brezhnev's personal status. Press treatment of Brezhnev, who attended all four ceremonies, followed a carefully set pattern in each case. Yet while Brezhnev was denied any personal flattery in 1967-68, he was accorded four or five paragraphs of personal praise at the recent ceremonies, in August for Kazakhstan and in October for Azerbaydzhan.

In introducing Brezhnev at the December 1967 Ukrainian ceremony Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest voiced no compliments, simply thanking Brezhnev for his attendance. Belorussian First Secretary Masharov referred to Brezhnev in the same manner at the December 1968 Belorussian ceremony. The determination to avoid any personal buildup of Brezhnev was underscored by PRAVDA's deletion of a passage in his Belorussian speech referring to his brief tenure in Belorussia.

At the recent ceremonies Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev and Azerbaydzhan First Secretary Aliyev, both proteges of Brezhnev, delivered lavish tributes to Brezhnev, and their remarks were published in the central press. Both Kunayev and Aliyev praised Brezhnev as an "outstanding" leader of the USSR and the international communist movement and as "a true Leninist" who "heads the Central Committee." Moreover, while Kunayev recalled Brezhnev's past leadership of the Kazakh party organization, Aliyev called attention to Brezhnev's services in defense of the Caucasus in World War II.

In addition to publicizing these tributes, PRAVDA devoted more space to Brezhnev's recent anniversary speeches. While his speeches in the Ukraine and Belorussia each rated less than one page, his speeches in Kazakhstan and Azerbaydzhan occupied almost two pages each. Despite these gains, however, Brezhnev was denied the title of leader of the CPSU Politburo in PRAVDA's coverage of the Azerbaydzhan celebration. According to the live broadcasts, the Azerbaydzhan ceremony had as its honorary presidium the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev, but PRAVDA deleted the controversial formulation "headed by."